Towards a more secure border control with 3D face recognition by Busch, C. et al.
Towards a more Secure Border Control
with 3D Face Recognition
Christoph Busch*, Michael Brauckmann†, Raymond Veldhuis‡,
Farzin Deravi§, Tom Kevenaar¶, Alexander Nouak‖,
Helmut Seibert**, Frank Weber††, Jean-Marc Suchier‡‡
Abstract
Biometric data have been integrated in all ICAO compliant passports, since
the ICAO members started to implement the ePassport standard. The
additional use of three-dimensional models promises significant performance
enhancements for border control points. By combining the geometry- and
texture-channel information of the face, 3D face recognition systems show
an improved robustness while processing variations in poses and problematic
lighting conditions when taking the photo. This even holds in a hybrid
scenario, when a 3D face scan is compared to a 2D reference image.
To assess the potential of three-dimensional face recognition, the 3D Face
project was initiated. This paper outlines the approach and research results of
this project: The objective was not only to increase the recognition rate but
also to develop a new, fake resistant capture device. In addition, methods
for protection of the biometric template were researched and the second
generation of the international standard ISO/IEC 19794-5:2011 was inspired
by the project results.
1 Introduction
Facial images – even though in analogue form – have always been an essential part of
passports and those travel documents have been used worldwide. When the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) introduced the concept of electronic passports the
need for global interoperability and security of such documents became a pressing issue.
With ICAO standard 9303 for the storage of biometric data in machine-readable travel
∗C. Busch: Hochschule Darmstadt , Germany and Gjøvik University College, Norway
(email: christoph.busch@cased.de)
†M. Brauckmann: L-1 Identity Solutions AG, Bochum, Germany
‡R. Veldhuis: Twente University, Twente, The Netherlands
§F. Deravi: University of Kent, Canterbury, U.K.
¶T. Kevenaar: Philips Research Europe, Eindhoven, The Netherlands
‖A. Nouak: Fraunhofer Institute for Computer Graphics Research IGD, Darmstadt, Germany
∗∗H. Seibert: Computer Graphics Centre, Germany
††F. Weber: Cognitec Systems GmbH, Dresden, Germany
‡‡J.-M. Suchier: Morpho, Paris, France was the coordinator of the project 3D Face
(email: jean-marc.suchier@morpho.com)
This paper was presented at the NISK-2012 conference; see http://www.frisc.no/.
documents [1] [2], a technical specification was provided that formulates the basis for
new border control points supported by means of biometric 2D face recognition systems.
These specifications were transformed into legal regulations such as the European
Council’s regulation on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and
travel documents issued by EU Member States [3]. Since November 2005 many ICAO
member states have integrated at least a digital face image into newly issued passports.
According to an ICAO estimate as of July 2011 approximately 350 million biometric
passports have been issued.
As a good share of ICAO compliant ePassports is in the field now, the first border
control points are augmented with 2D face recognition technologies [4]. However the
limits of this approach are well known: Once strong differences in the capture conditions
between enrolment and recognition occur – then the performance of such systems is
dissatisfying, These differences may include the orientation and alignment of the face
(pose), changes in the lighting conditions and other disturbing factors. All these factors
negatively impact the quality of the image and may deteriorate the recognition sample
compared to the reference photo. Even more aggravating is the fact that no reliable
liveness detection is available with 2D face recognition systems.
2 Approach
The project 3D Face was supported by the European Commission within the scope of
the Sixth Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP6)
and focused on 3D face recognition research. The project consortium was constituted
with major players in different fields: i) Industry (Bundesdruckerei, Philips Research,
MORPHO – formerly Sagem Sécurité, L1 Identity Solution) ii) SMEs (Cognitec, Polygon
Technology) iii) Research Centres (Fraunhofer-IGD, Computer Graphics Center, National
Research Council , Joint Research Centre) iv) Universities (Univ. of Kent, Univ.
of Twente, Hochschule Darmstadt) v) Operators (Airport Berlin, Airport Salzburg,
Bundeskriminalamt)
The project developed a prototype for an automatic border control gate and therefore
exploits biometric data that is captured through three-dimensional face scans [5]. We
do however integrate 2D face recognition approaches and thus our gate is backward
compliant to deployed systems. Essential for our approach is, to use the rich information
provided by the geometry of the face surface. The technologies and processes of 3D
face recognition are, on the one hand, expected to provide for a significant performance
enhancement, on the other hand, they provide the basis for a fake resistant capture
device. This is the pre-condition of any possibly unattended border control and thus
rapid processing in self-service border crossing [6]. With the definition of data formats
the second generation of the international standard ISO/IEC 19794-5:2011 was inspired
by the project results[7].
The approach of the 3D Face research is structured along objectives that are detailed
in the following subsections.
3D capture device
An essential concern in the development of a suitable capture device is to generate both
3D data and high-resolution 2D data within the same coordinate system, by which both
shorter exposure times and a minimized impact of the lighting conditions is strived for.
The developed capture device consists of an active stripe projecting unit and a high
resolution camera (1280 x 960 ppi) taking 2D photographs thereby capturing the texture
while a high-speed camera at a frame rate of 100 fps serves for capturing the 3D data. A
total scan duration of approx. 0.25 seconds is achieved. The generated data is provided in
the original format either as a scatter plot, as VRML 2.0 data or as range image.
Figure 1: Capture device (left) and three-dimensional face scanning (right)
Analysing the recognition performance requires a comprehensive database, which is
composed in two stages. In the first stage, the 2D and 3D face data of 600 volunteers
was captured under laboratory conditions at three different sites, different dates and at
largest possible face variance in terms of hair, headgears or glasses. This database was
partly used for algorithm development and partly for testing procedures. In the second
stage data acquired in the field test of the project was added to the database. Under
realistic operational conditions the data of approx. 2,000 volunteers were captured with
the intention to validate meaningful results confirming the achievement of the project
objectives.
Normalization and feature extraction
Compared to the 2D technologies and processes, 3D face recognition provides far more
information and we can assume a higher discriminatory power of the classification
process. This is supported by the findings of Lu and Jain showing – on a database of
100 subjects – that with the analysis of both 3D and 2D information the success rate
could be raised from 84% (2D) to 98% (3D+2D) [8]. Before a 3D model can be analyzed
and features are derived, which in turn can be compared to a reference data, we need
to translate and rotate the model to a proper (defined) standard orientation such that an
identical alignment of the models can be achieved. This operation is considered as a
normalization of the data set. For that facial landmarks (eye corners, nose etc.) have to
be located that serve as reference marks [9]. Commonly this is solved with optimization
of some global measure [10]. Once the re-orientation to a standard alignment has been
completed, features can be extracted. These features include model intrinsic measures
such as local curvature metrics, proportionality measures between landmarks and distance
measures between models such as the Hausdorff-distance[11].
Data fusion
With the capture device providing for two dependent information channels we get
separated but related face textural and face geometrical data. We can consider them as
two biometric modalities and thus we apply multimodal analysis concepts and processes
[12][13]. Traditionally, the Feature-Level-Fusion, Score-Level-Fusion, and Decision-
Level-Fusion concepts are applied in multimodal analysis. Score-Level-Fusion implies
complex normalization algorithms, as the scores may represent different scales. The
Decision-Level-Fusion concept is of particular interest when using several information
channels (e. g. face image, face geometry, high-resolution skin texture etc.), in which
case a comparison is considered to match if a positive decision is made in each channel
or the comparators majority decision rule is applied. Promising results were achieved
recently with an Optimized-Decision-Rule [14]. This will be detailed in Section 3.
Template protection
As part of the research the application of template protection techniques such as
Cancelable Biometrics or Biometric Encryption was explored [15]. The principal goal
is to provide advanced privacy enhancing technology (PET) by design for biometric
references such that a reference can not been reverted to biometric samples and to allow
renewability of templates at the same time.
The approach is similar to the protection of password data in a Unix system. For the
Unix verification the password of a system user is not stored as plain text in the system (or
a database). Rather a hash value is computed when setting up a user account (enrolment)
applying a hash function. This function is non-invertible, i. e. the hash value cannot be re-
translated (computed) into the password. In addition, only collision-free hash functions
are used, i. e. there are no two input strings (passwords) resulting in the same hash value.
The hash values of all users are stored in a publicly available file. If the user wishes to
authenticate himself, a new hash value is computed from his input and then compared to
the one stored in the table.
The process chosen to protect the templates can be designed in a similar manner.
Biometric samples and therefore also the feature vectors are, however, – as opposed to
the passwords – impacted by noise. This is due to varying environmental impacts (e. g.
lighting conditions) but also due to the variation of the biometric characteristic itself (e. g.
aging). For this reasons, error correction coding schemes are adopted to enhance the
robustness to noise[16][17]. While in the literature a variety of approaches for template
protection was proposed they can all be mapped to a single reference framework[18],
which has been turned into an international standard recently[19].
3 Results
Standardized orientation of 3D models
The capture process of living subjects, especially when capturing human faces, is
generating 3D models, which are rotated and translated due to different poses. The need
to transform 3D models into a standardized orientation (normalization) prior to feature
extraction requires additional efforts. As constrained by the application scenarios this
processing step does not allow for any manual interaction. A precise solution of this
task is of outmost importance to achieve robustness with regard to pose variations of the
individual in the capture process. To allow the comparison of the datasets resulting from
different capturing sessions, it is necessary to define a local coordinate system relative to
known subject landmarks. This local coordinate system then allows the alignment of the
datasets by applying the appropriate translation and rotation.
The normalization procedure is a preprocessing step which yields the appropriate
rotation RNO usually represented as a 3 × 3 matrix and translation TNO represented as
a 3 element vector for each dataset and applies this transformation to each dataset
accordingly. A normalized object point P′i can be obtained from Pi by applying the
following transformation:
P′i = R
N
O · Pi + TNO (1)
As we are dealing with a face model, there is some a-priori knowledge about the shape.
A face is usually nearly symmetric with respect to a plane and there are very dominant
landmarks of each face, the root and tip of the nose. Most of the algorithms developed
are based on the assumption that the nose can be identified as maximum length convex
hull segment in the horizontal direction. The endpoints of these segments build a virtual
bridge that can be estimated by applying a Principal Components Analysis (PCA)[20].
The rotation R is estimated in such a manner that it aligns the root of the nose to the
physical constraints in the face. Subsequently R and T are applied to the entire point set
in the model and the nose tip is again identified in the translated and rotated model. This
sequence of steps is repeated over several iterations.
The robustness of this approach is dependent on the sample quality achieved by the
capture device. While for the 3D database version 2.0 composed in FRGC consisting
of 557 subjects and 4950 models the failure-to-normalize rate (FTN) was 11.2 % the
equivalent rate for our own sensor the FTN was reduced to 0,6 % based on 105 subjects
and 11.000 models that were collected in one of our field trials.
As a result of the developed registration algorithm we are able to transform face
datasets, which have a sufficient representation of the nose region, into a standard
orientation, which allows further processing towards a comparison of different datasets.
Fusion concepts
In this section, we analyze the recognition performance of the multi-biometric (i.e. multi-
modal and multi-algorithm) scenario in which information from various channels is
analyzed and fused at feature-, score-, and decision-level. We focus on the 3D shape
and 2D image recognition algorithms of a single vendor which is processed with multiple
template protection algorithms. First of all, the individual 3D and 2D performance is
analyzed and the optimum setting of the privacy protection algorithm is determined for
each recognition algorithm. With the optimal settings, the feature-, score-, and decision-
level fusion are tested.
For testing purposes of both the 3D and 2D algorithm, 3993 samples from our
operational testing database were successfully extracted. The database was composed
at the locations of our field trial in Airport Berlin Schönefeld, Airport Salzburg and at
the German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA). There are 278 subjects with 6 or more samples,
resulting in totally 3512 samples. Hence, both the training and test set have approximately
139 subjects selected randomly. Furthermore, the fusion training and validation sets at the
second split contain approximately 70 subjects each.
We conclude by providing the ROC curves in Figure 2 of the best cases obtained
at feature-level (Ftr), score-level (Scr) and decision-level (Dec) fusion. The ROCs are
compared with the individual performances of the 3D and 2D recognition algorithms. As
the results do indicate, the score-level fusion has the best overall performance. It improved
at the target of FAR= 0.25% the FRR from 0.57% ± 0.08% to 0.48% ± 0.08%. The
privacy parameter (Npriv) for the individual recognition algorithm and at each possible
fusion level is given in Table 1. Note that these values are obtained when operating at the
target performance of FAR=0.25%. In this case, not only did the performance improve
with fusion, but also the privacy parameter Npriv. At feature-level fusion Npriv is the
largest, however its performance is the worst and it does not outperform the individual
2D recognition algorithm. The best performance is achieved at score-level fusion and
improved Npriv from 23 to 34 bits.
Figure 2: Summary of the best performance achieved at feature-level (Ftr), score-level
(Scr), and decision-level (Dec) fusion compared to the individual 3D and 2D recognition
algorithm performances
Individual algorithms
Individual recognition algorithms Npriv in bits
3D 23
2D 23
Fusion of the two algorithms (multi-algorithm fusion)
Fusion level Npriv in bits
Feature-level 45
Score-level (Weighted-Sum with soft “OR”-rule) min(34, 34) = 34
Decision-level (optimal “OR”-rule) min(34, 34) = 34
Table 1: Privacy parameter (Npriv) for multi-modal fusion at a target FAR = 0.25%
The project presented in this paper was one of the first European projects with
an emphasis on template protection. We described a reference architecture for
template protection and carefully defined the requirements necessary for a successful
implementation[18].
The privacy protection algorithm has been successfully adapted to the facial features
provided by the partners. Software was delivered supporting the features from the
partners and integrated into the prototype that was rolled out to the field trial sites. The
performance of the privacy protection algorithm has also been tested with the publicly
available database FRGCv21; furthermore the software was independently tested with
1see http://www.nd.edu/~cvrl/CVRL/Data_Sets.html
the internally created database. The two independent test confirmed the results obtained
during the development phase.
Fusion in the context of a template protection framework was studied in a multi-
algorithm (two 3D recognition algorithm) and a multi-modal (a 3D and a 2D recognition
algorithms) scenario. For each scenario, we studied the performance using different
fusion methods at feature-, score-, and decision-level. For both scenarios, the score-level
fusion led to the best performance. The performance relatively improved with almost
27% compared to the performance of the single recognition algorithms.
The privacy and security of the privacy protection algorithm are also addressed. It
is proved that the ability of privacy preserving can be realized with high amount of
uncertainty about the original biometric feature given the stored references. However
the security of system may be limited in the case that the FAR at the operational point is
high.
Hybrid Scenario – Operating with existing 2D reference
For the time being the border control at the outer Schengen borders will be based on the
current electronic passports that store only a two-dimensional facial reference. 3D facial
data could in principle be stored in a standardized data interchange record according to
19794-5:2011 [7] but until adoption of this standard and wide deployment in passport
readers some time may pass. Thus it is of interest, to which extend biometric performance
can be improved with a hybrid scenario, where a 3D-scan taken at the border control is
compared against the 2D reference read from the 19794-5:2005 compliant passport. In
Figure 3 the possible three scenarios are illustrated.
Figure 3: Three possible verification scenarios at Border crossing
The hybrid setup takes benefits from the 3D face scanning only at verification attempt,
when the probe sample is generated. This hybrid scenario was evaluated in the project
against the optimal 3D versus 3D comparison and further against widely deployed 2D
versus 2D comparison. For testing the hybrid scenario the probe sample is taken from
the challenging data from our data collection that contains both pose variations as well
as expressions. The reference sample is a frontal image with neutral expression, as it is
used for passport images but with a higher resolution. The major benefit of the hybrid
scenario is that in the comparison step the uncontrolled pose of the data subject can be
corrected. Note that due to the stronger operator guidance at enrolment the risk that a
pose correction is needed for the reference image is small, as such a sample would not be
ICAO-compliant.
Figure 4: Benchmarking the three possible verification scenarios
The result of the benchmarking of the three possible scenarios is illustrated in Figure 4.
It becomes obvious that just the pose correction that is possible with the 3D-scan at
the border improves texture recognition considerably when benchmarked against plain
2D comparison. The 3D information for pose correction is useful whenever there is
something to correct. If the data is frontal data already – as it can be assumed for the
enrolment image from the passport application – one should not try to correct it, since
3D cannot improve the situation, every change is pointing away from the optimum (pink
ROC is below green ROC).
Field Trial
The components developed within the project were evaluated in three field trials. They
took place within three months at the Schönefeld Airport in Berlin, the Salzburg Airport
and at the Bundeskriminalamt Wiesbaden (BKA).
The setup of the trials was very similar. Participants were enroled once. During the
enrolment, 3D Face templates were created and stored on the RFID card (see Figure 5)
which was personalised on site and issued to each volunteer. The access to the RFID chip
was secured with Basic Access Control (BAC) which is well known from the electronic
passport.
Figure 5: 3D Face_ID Card 1
The verification equipment was installed at the security checkpoint of the airports,
were staff crosses to the airside. The security area is a very busy place and especially in
Berlin it is open 24/7.
In order to perform verification the participant had to place the ID card with the MRZ
on the reader. Based on the MRZ, the reader performed the Basic Access Protocol and
gained access to the RFID chip where he read out the 3D Face reference template.
In parallel the 3D Sensor captured the live image of the data subject. Once the
live image has been captured and the reference been read out, the system performed a
biometric verification. The result of the verification process was stored within a database
in order to determine FRR and FAR rates.
Figure 6: The verification station at Berlin Schönefeld, the enrolment station at Airport
Salzburg and the verification station at BKA
The volunteers were instructed and trained during enrolment only. The whole
verification trial was done without any guidance (except technical problems) or individual
feedback concerning the recognition rates. It was decided to do so, because we did not
want the participants to present themselves in a specific manner in order to be accepted.
In Schönefeld 135 volunteers participated in the test and performed 17.355
verifications. In Salzburg 102 persons conducted 7.112 verifications, in Wiesbaden 104
persons conducted 11.300 verifications. Based on data collected at the three sites a
mediums scale validation tests were organised at the end of the project. These tests
involved all 347 data subjects – none of which was a biometric expert – and furthermore
more than 35.000 verification attempts. The operational capture devices are shown in
Figure 6. The intention of the field trial was to achieve two main goals:
• Validate project scientific results in a real application context,
• Learn from the observations made on the field what the perfect border control
system should be.
All the verification attempts were analyzed off line in order to determine the
operational biometric performances of the overall system. It is quite clear that human
aspects and the interaction of subjects with the capture device impacts the testing results.
The strong majority of data subject interacted with the capture device and the access
control system as specified and expected. However on the contrary some participants
played with the system by trading ID tokens for example. These subjects were classified
as gambling persons during the offline analysis. Furthermore some data subjects were not
captured properly as they were moving, speaking during the acquisition device, placed
themselves too close/too far from the system and so on. These cases are interesting
because they allow insight in the usability tolerance when a subject initiated deviation
from the ICAO requirements occurs. Moreover they indicate that ergonomic aspects are
of high importance. With respect to biometric performance of the field trial prototype the
accuracy at the algorithm level reached the goal of the project FRR < 2, 5% at a FAR
< 0, 25% with an operational FRR of even below 2%. However the detailed analysis
of the transaction disclosed that accuracy drop was significant, when unforeseen user
behavior had to be compensated.
4 Conclusion
3D face recognition technology can be exploited to improve the border control process,
when 3D samples are compared against 2D facial images (as currently stored in
ePassports). As indicated in this work this would minimize spoofing attacks in a
self-service facility and allow for certain improvements in the biometric performance:
Moreover the border control gate can effectively compare a pose-corrected 2D image
(rendered from the 3D acquired model) with the 2D biometric reference (extracted from
the ePassport) in order to achieve the best possible performance in the given border
control situation. Deficiencies of existing 2D-to-2D comparisons due to mismatching
poses (probe image vs. reference image) can thus be eliminated, as the pose normalization
of the 3D model and rendering the best corresponding pose is an intrinsic property of the
3D acquisition device.
Field tests for wider evaluation of this technology have been conducted with the
Airport Berlin Schönefeld (Germany) and the Airport Salzburg (Austria) and also the
German Bundeskriminalamt.
All algorithms showed significant performance improvements during the different
stages (starting from 30% FRR at FAR=0.25% to below 2% FRR at FAR=0.25% for
the best integrated 3D+2D approaches for even the most challenging scenario). Using
fusion, several combinations of recognition algorithms were able to meet the set goals of
a maximum FRR of 2.5% at a FAR of 0.25% under the realistic conditions of the field
tests.
In the long term future 3D facial information from the border control gate could be
compared with 3D information from the document, if ICAO decides that the ePassport
additionally stores such 3D shape information (in consequence of a revision of ICAO
9303). In preparation of such a revision the 3D Face project has impacted the ISO
standardization work: The projects results have been transported to ISO/IEC JTC SC37
WG3 and the definition of ISO/IEC 19794-5. The compact data format for the interchange
of 3D models is reflected in the recently released standard ISO/IEC 19794-5:2011. With
this new revision the plain range images and also 3D point maps as well as 3D vertex
encoding are embedded in Biometric Data Blocks. In order to guarantee backwards
compatibility, no change of the encoding of the existing 2D image in the 19794-5:2005
data structure is necessary and in consequence 2D and 3D border gates could be operated
in parallel.
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